



PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT AND SOCIAL INVESTMENT IN THE NIGER DELTA

A Case Study of Chevron's Partnership
with the U.S. Agency for International Development

2010 - 2019

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McDonough School of Business
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
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Executive Summary

Nigeria's Niger Delta is an oil-rich, conflict affected, underdeveloped region that has seen recurring waves of violence and conflict over the last several decades. Yet, in this region of extremes, the spirit of human progress, hope in the future, and a mindset of innovation is possible to cultivate to help improve developmental outcomes.

An African proverb states, *"If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together."* This business case will illustrate the ways in which Chevron and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) leveraged each other's interests and unique organizational advantages to go far and fast together—realizing collective impact in a strategically important yet dangerous, poverty-stricken environment.

Chevron, a U.S. energy company, sought to financially and physically de-risk its operations in the Niger Delta. Toward this end, it leveraged local knowledge, networks, and credibility to invest in a Niger Delta-wide suite of programs for market-based economic growth, peacebuilding, and capacity building. Recognizing the value of USAID's development expertise and national networks, Chevron invited USAID to partner with them in the Niger Delta in 2010, a new operating region for USAID. This partnership remains robust today.

This business case focuses on the approach, joint programs, and resulting impacts of the partnership between USAID and sister non-profit foundations established by Chevron but independently run and governed by two separate boards, the DC-based Niger Delta Partnership Initiative (NDPI) and Nigeria-based Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND).¹ The intent of this business case is to surface lessons learned from Chevron, especially NDPI/PIND[†] and USAID's partnership. It seeks to inform improved private sector engagement and to explore broader applicability of the findings for adoption by other partners across analogous

contexts. This case should also help inform USAID's private sector engagement research and learning agenda, which seeks to collect, evaluate, and index insights across the Agency's corporate partnerships.²

Since the eruption of violence in the early 2000s, the Niger Delta was largely abandoned by the international development community due to both security concerns and more pressing development objectives elsewhere in the country. Yet, international energy companies like Chevron continued to deeply invest in the Niger Delta. As a private sector actor, Chevron's social investments, especially through its Global Memorandum of Understanding with community clusters, remained one of the very few meaningful sources of economic development and social service provision, often overshadowing even the local government.

Thus, with Chevron's realization that the Niger Delta needed more economic development, job creation, and stability for the success of their operations, the region was ripe for private sector engagement for development. Chevron brought deep knowledge and networks of the Niger Delta and knowledge of the local development context while USAID brought a wealth of international development expertise. Moreover, their complementary and synergistic skills and knowledge along with their combined funding enabled broader and deeper implementation than either could have achieved alone.

NDPI/PIND launched their partnership with USAID at their founding in 2010, though they have many other donor relationships. Since then, they have co-invested and collaborated on four projects over the subsequent decade. Over this time, their partnership has grown and evolved, rising to the complex challenges of the Niger Delta.

[†]Throughout this case study, the partnership is referred to as 'NDPI/PIND'.

FINDINGS

In the nine years of partnership to-date, NDPI/PIND and USAID have together **strengthened the capacity of numerous Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), business organizations, local governments, and other societal actors seeking the development, stability, and prosperity of the Niger Delta.** NDPI/PIND and USAID have together trained tens of thousands of farmers to pursue agriculture as a business, beyond subsistence, and strengthened the value chains and systems to bring those products to markets in the Niger Delta and beyond. This has improved food security and economic growth in communities all over the region. Both partners admitted that these gains could not have been achieved alone.

One of NDPI/PIND's most substantial contributions to the partnership is its prioritization of and contribution toward sustainability. NDPI/PIND's long-term commitment to the region, use of short-term grants for partner CSOs to bridge between USAID projects, and its commitment to partnering with other private sector entities in the Niger Delta have contributed to this sustainability. **Sustainable models take time, but private sector partners who plan on long-term investments can help make that time in order to establish and ensure sustainability becomes a reality.**




Table 1 - Strengths and Weaknesses of the USAID Partnerships with NDPI/PIND

		STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
PLANNING	Agenda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Closely aligned goals for Niger Delta and clear understanding of each partner's motivations • Mutual respect for comparative capabilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sometimes lacked true co-creation, instead only consulting with NDPI/PIND on USAID designs
	Design Process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Various forms of joint or shared analysis, delegated based on strengths of each partner • Clear resource provision planning • NDPI/PIND provided in-kind support so as not to spend too much on implementing partner overhead costs • PIND sat on some USAID technical review committees for the projects that it co-funded 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Program design did not include clauses for adaptive management, allowing for changing technical direction or dissolving the partnership if necessary • Program design did not include clear plans for partners reporting jointly to NDPI/PIND and USAID
	Getting Started	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly engaged leadership at all levels of both organizations supported the partnership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID contracts did not allow sufficient flexibility for adapting to contextual changes • USAID implementing partner could not adjust approach in MARKETS II to match NDPI/PIND's approach
EXECUTION	Relationship Development and Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NDPI/PIND's development and markets experts facilitated smooth cooperation with local private sector partners • Both partners supported each other's capacity building and knowledge development • USAID project technical assistance co-located in PIND's office • PIND office near USAID office in Abuja facilitated regular communication between senior leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID MARKETS II team did not have shared language with NDPI/PIND for engaging private sector partners • Did not have a clear plan for co-branding and sharing the credit for programmatic successes in reports and press releases at the local, national, and international level • USAID and NDPI/PIND lacked coordination for branding in public reports and press releases to ensure consistent recognition of both partners
	Accountability and Oversight	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint monitoring trips to the field • Joint monitoring templates with agreed-upon indicators 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Differing implementation approaches in MARKETS II, and organizational pressures with respect to timing of results, resulted in differing and sometimes contradictory metrics

Since 2010, NDPI/PIND have **catalyzed** over \$100 million in additional investments into the Niger Delta, steering States in the region to develop long-term plans for sustainable development, leveraging partnerships and making way for other development actors to the historically fragile region.³ The successes of USAID and NDPI/PIND's partnership as they grew together in the Niger Delta attracted the attention of other major development institutions. In addition to welcoming other

donors to the Niger Delta, their joint projects have raised the capacity of local CSOs to receive international grants. **USAID and NDPI/PIND's partnership has made way for more development partnerships in the Niger Delta.**

This decade has seen both synergies and snags in the partnership between NDPI/PIND and USAID. The strengths and weaknesses of the partnership across the four projects is detailed in Table 1 on the previous page.



RECOMMENDATIONS

The report offers several recommendations for USAID, NDPI, and PIND, in addition to other public and private sector partners who might wish to emulate their partnership.

Table 2 – Recommendations

FOR USAID/NIGERIA AND USAID/ WASHINGTON DECISIONMAKERS

- Encourage and incentivize staff to develop private sector partnerships
- Ensure that USAID corporate relationship managers have private sector expertise, operational empathy, and sufficient seniority to influence decision-making
- Seek true co-creation with private sector partners early in the project design process
- Plan for co-branding and shared press releases to acknowledge partner contributions alongside USAID.
- Plan monitoring and reporting processes to minimize reporting burdens from differing fiscal calendars and acknowledge joint accountability
- Plan for smooth transitions in relationship turnover
- Host fora dedicated to shared reflection and learning on private sector engagement

FOR PIND

- Ensure that contracts with partner donors include provisions to increase NDPI/PIND's leverage over co-invested projects
- Expand PIND's small grants capabilities
- Explore connections across operational sectors for synergistic monitoring and implementation
- Leverage monitoring data to better inform Chevron Nigeria of contextual dynamics and shifts in the Niger Delta

FOR NDPI

- Publicly elevate NDPI/PIND's successes and learnings
- Engage with non-traditional partners to further share NDPI/PIND's proven methods
- Foster social enterprise learning at Chevron across regions

FOR OTHER INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES OPERATING IN THE NIGER DELTA

- Emulate the successes of the NDPI/PIND model
- Consider co-investing development initiatives in the region
- Recognize and leverage your power for progress


FOR OTHER CORPORATIONS SEEKING TO ENGAGE USAID IN PARTNERSHIP

- Seek and secure a shared vision for development outcomes that creates a compelling agenda for change
- Formulate learning questions for USAID to explore opportunities for collaboration along comparative advantage
- Design and govern social enterprise investments with independence, sustainability, and resilience in mind
- Consider joining development fora to explore partnership opportunities

FOR DONORS SEEKING TO DEEPEN PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT

- Seek opportunities for co-location of implementing teams with private sector partner staff
- Consider the longevity of private sector partnerships
- Be strategic about learning throughout private sector engagement

NDPI/PIND and their foundational partnership with USAID provide a rich and innovative model for pursuing development cooperation in complex and insecure spaces. NDPI/PIND proved that the private sector can lead donors into previously inaccessible areas. The partnership also demonstrated the synergistic value of private sector contextual expertise, business practices, and networks when combined with the deep development experience of traditional donors like USAID. Through long-term commitment to the Niger Delta, USAID and NDPI/PIND developed an effective partnership for development that continues to grow and evolve today.





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Niger Delta
the region

PIND
FOUNDATION FOR PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVES IN THE NIGER DELTA

About PIND
PIND is a non-profit organization working to build partnerships for peace and equitable economic development in the Niger Delta. We hope to achieve a legacy of sustainable peace and development among communities in the Niger Delta.

We hold strongly to the core values of partnership and collaboration, learning and innovation, stewardship, sustainability and integrity.

Our strategic priorities centre around economic development, peace building, capacity building and analysis and advocacy.

We leverage our extensive local knowledge of the Delta, market driven approach expertise, access to market and peace actors, technical expertise, data resources and network of partners to bring real value to development in the Niger Delta.

Where We Work

- Shell Research Center, Port Harcourt
- Shell Refinery, Port Harcourt
- Shell Refinery, Warri



Introduction

The complex challenges of endemic poverty and recurrent violent conflict in some of the world's most fragile countries require innovative approaches and diverse partnerships for peace and development. Especially in complex, conflict affected contexts, the private sector is recognized as a constructive, but often untapped, resource for early warning, mitigating, and disincentivizing violence.⁴ Indeed, global private capital flows far exceed Official Development Assistance (ODA) from donor governments.⁵

Recognizing this, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) released its *Private Sector Engagement (PSE) Policy* in late 2018. The new policy articulates an updated strategic approach to partnering with and engaging the private sector. It affirms that market-based approaches are essential to sustainability, improving countries' self-reliance, and "ending the need for foreign assistance." This Policy also encourages expanded private sector engagement throughout the lifecycle of USAID development investments.⁶

An African proverb states, *"If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together."* This business case will illustrate the ways in which Chevron and USAID leveraged each other's interests and organizational advantages to go far and fast together—seeking to improve the safety, economic security, and democratic voice of the people from the Niger Delta over the past ten years. Home to more than 30 million people, the Niger Delta has suffered from chronic conflict and limited economic opportunity. At the same time, the region is important for oil revenues and U.S. foreign policy.

Chevron, an energy company, sought to financially and physically de-risk its operations in the Niger Delta. Toward this end, it leveraged local knowledge, networks, and credibility to invest in a Delta-wide suite of programs for peace building and economic development. Recognizing the value of USAID's development expertise and national networks, Chevron invited USAID into partnership in the Niger Delta in 2010, a new operating region for USAID. This partnership remains robust today.

This business case focuses on the approach, joint programs, and resulting impacts of the partnership between USAID and sister foundations established by Chevron, the DC-based Niger Delta Partnership Initiative (NDPI) and the Nigeria-based Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND).⁷ Since 2010, NDPI/PIND's collaboration with USAID has catalyzed several other partnerships in the Niger Delta. As such, this case focuses on this foundational partnership. NDPI commissioned this business case, which was conducted as an independent study by Frontier Design under a contract with Georgetown University's Business for Impact.

In 2016, a midterm impact evaluation examined the NDPI/PIND's unique social enterprise model and the extent to which NDPI/PIND affected systemic change in the Niger Delta.⁸ The evaluation found that NDPI/PIND's portfolio had reached a mature pilot stage, driving toward scale and eventual systematic change. It also determined that the NDPI/PIND model could provide an effective blueprint for social enterprise investments elsewhere, and that NDPI/PIND had sufficiently reduced risk in the region to draw in other development actors.⁹

Indeed, NDPI/PIND have expanded to several other international partners in the Niger Delta, including the United Kingdom's Department For International Development (DFID) and the U.S.-based Ford Foundation.

This business case builds off of the midterm evaluation to surface lessons learned from NDPI/PIND and USAID's partnership. It seeks to inform improved private sector engagement and to explore broader applicability of the findings for adoption by other partners across analogous contexts. This case should also help inform USAID's private sector engagement research and learning agenda, which seeks to collect, evaluate, and index insights across the Agency's corporate partnerships.¹⁰

The insights in this case have been informed by an extensive review of literature, which included scholarly works, industry publications, and program documents, and interviews with roughly 30 individuals in the U.S. and Nigeria. Interviews were conducted on a 'not for attribution' basis and included current and former senior Chevron and USAID officials in Washington, D.C. and in Nigeria, NDPI and PIND executive leadership, board members, and staff, a Nigerian journalist, and implementing partner staff. NDPI funded this research to be conducted independently by Frontier Design, a strategy and innovation consultancy with extensive international development and peacebuilding experience, via a contract under Georgetown University's McDonough School of Business initiative, Business for Impact. The Business for Impact team provided private sector expertise, technical oversight, and quality assurance throughout this project. Any mistakes or omissions are the authors' entirely.

“A slowing economy and growing discord in the Niger Delta may seem like insurmountable problems, but [NDPI] and our Nigeria-based implementing partner, [PIND], are demonstrating how to improve incomes and reduce strife in a difficult environment. Our focus has always remained on using a comprehensive, market-based approach that tackles the root causes of poverty in all of its various forms”

*–Mamadou Beye,
NDPI Chairman¹¹*


“We believe that private enterprise is the only sustainable way to lift lives, to build communities, and so we're dedicated to working to find ways to ease the barriers for businesses to participate.”

*– Former USAID Administrator
Mark Green¹²*

Framing: Private Sector Engagement

Historically, companies in the extractive sector have taken short-term, small gain approaches to community relations that have failed to make a lasting impact.¹³ This “band-aid approach to community relations in order to secure a ‘social license to operate’” not only fails to fix deep-rooted issues within host communities but also fails to remedy shortcomings in business growth.¹⁴ Although many companies still pursue short-term gains, some extractive firms have started to shift their approach to focusing on long-term investments to address underlying social problems.¹⁵

For example, after recognizing \$100 million in philanthropic and community investments were making little impact improving the operating environment in the Wood Buffalo municipality in Alberta, the Canadian energy company Suncor Energy created the Social Prosperity Wood Buffalo project. This project was designed to develop the local non-governmental organization (NGO) community to make it easier to hire and retain a local work force. By working to address the root causes of social issues in Wood Buffalo with the community and local organizations, Suncor is building a better community and improving the operating conditions, which will increase their business value over the long-term.¹⁶



Conversely, the MMG Ltd. Las Bambas copper project in Peru has remained focused on short-term philanthropic investments to secure the ability to operate amongst local communities. Before operations began, they made quick-fix investments in response to local requests. However, community appeasement gained from these investments was short-lived and the community’s demands—and consequences for not meeting them—have only intensified.¹⁷ The mine’s operation has been significantly hindered by several month-long blockades by local communities. The most recent of these occurred in May 2019, a week after an agreement was signed between MMG Ltd. and the local community. These constant flare-ups highlight that, without long-term positive relationship-building, tensions can resume on a regular basis.¹⁸


Table 3 – Unsuccessful and Successful Private Sector Engagement

Project	Unsuccessful: Jakarta Water Project	Successful: Tajikistan Energy Sector Project
Problem	Only 43.5% of Jakarta's population had access to tap water	Remote, poor region of Tajikistan suffering energy shortages Economic, human development at standstill
Private Sector Component	All assets, including network, treatment plants and equipment transferred from public entity to private companies Took charge of raw water supply, cleaning raw water, pipe network, and customer service Contract required the private companies to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expand existing pipeline Add 1.5 million customers Increase water supply Reduce non-revenue water 	Private company was expected to utilize government assets, but under private sector management, to bring 14 megawatts of new capacity and upgrade existing generation capacity Private company was responsible for the installation of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regulating structure for a local lake Headrace tunnel and penstocks Turbines and generators Transmission and distribution improvements Local management
Goal vs. End State	2023: Provide universal coverage <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2011: Financial loss of public utility was US\$18m 2017: Supreme Court orders end of project 2007: Supply clean water <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Residents rely on groundwater from community wells 70% of population access to piped water <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2013: Only 59.01% of Jakarta residents had access to piped water <35% water loss <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Water losses at 44% 	Turn loss-making utility into a sustainable energy system <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 653% ↓ in household energy costs 53% ↑ in small enterprises 80% ↑ in consumption 60% ↑ in test scores in schools Medical facilities perform operations previously not possible Computer, cell phone use improved local government effectiveness Only region in Tajikistan with excess energy in winter 2008: cross border line into Afghanistan
Reasons for Outcomes	Lack of thorough financial and economic analysis Inappropriate sharing of risks Lack of competitive procurement Lack of transparency and accountability	Maintained strong stakeholder support and ownership Strong (preferably local) management Listened to local community Focused on loss reduction rather than production increase Leveraged technology

Source: Jumaev, 2012; Wegmann & Lobina, 2018⁹

The shared value proposition of engagement between private companies and donors is compelling. Indeed, for 80% of companies that sought partnerships for social investments, maximizing growth and minimizing risk were key drivers of partnership.²⁰ As synthesized in USAID's PSE Policy for engaging for-profit companies, each partner's contribution can include:

Figure 1 – Private Sector Engagement Partnership Contributions




These relative contributions are not mutually exclusive. Significant overlap exists between the categories. Private sector entities have deep technical knowledge, extensive in country networks, and can often operate more nimbly and quickly than large donor organizations. Similarly, international donors can often achieve significant scale with large investments, seek to align programs with policy, and leverage significant development experience. In partnership, the compound result is expanded resources (e.g., monetary, physical, human, intellectual) with a much greater reach (e.g., geographic, influence, beneficiaries, networks).

As noted in Table 3, private sector engagement is not without its challenges. There are a variety of potential stumbling blocks that can impede overall progress and threaten the efficacy of even the most committed partnerships. In a recent analysis of

USAID's public-private partnerships from 2001 through 2014, the most prevalent challenges included mismatched execution and reporting timelines, labor-intensive time commitments to sustain relationships, lack of transparency of motivations and approaches between partners, lack of a strategic approach, a grantor mentality, and various institutional and cultural barriers that affected communication and co-creation.²¹

Whether driven by the private sector, government entities, or in true co-creation (see Figure 2), numerous principles for best practice in private sector engagement have emerged from PSE successes and failures across a variety of sectors. Perhaps most importantly, partners must come together around a compelling agenda for change. Table 4 below identifies some key best practices for private sector engagement.

Figure 2 – Private Sector Engagement Spectrum



Source: USAID Private Sector Engagement Policy, 2018

Table 4 – Best Practices in Private Sector Engagement

PLANNING	Agenda	Unite under compelling agenda for change <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Address a specific private sector need in convergence with societal needs
	Design Process	Joint or shared feasibility analysis Baseline assessments Joint strategic planning Clear commitments to what each partner will provide Plan for shared risk and reward
	Getting Started	Champions within each organization Plans should be flexible enough to adapt in real time <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Keep sustainability and longevity of partnership in mind
EXECUTION	Relationship Development and Communication	Private sector partner needs a diverse team with expertise in development practices Government partner needs staff with business skills and experience
	Accountability and Oversight	Transparency and mutually agreed performance metrics Joint monitoring and external evaluation processes

Source: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; de Sá, 2017; Friedman & Gantz, 2017; Hills, n.d.; Ingram et al., 2019; Nelson, 2017; World Economic Forum, 2013²²

Both USAID and NDPI/PIND have identified operational best practices for engaging in partnership between public and private sector entities, which cut across the categories above. As shown in Table 5 below, USAID's elements of best practices for private sector engagement highlight key partnership postures and processes for before, during, and long after engaging with the private sector for development outcomes.

Meanwhile, NDPI/PIND's best practices map well against USAID's priorities. All of these evolve throughout the partnership cycle.

The findings below examine which of these best practices were instrumental to USAID and NDPI/PIND's partnership over the last decade and which were absent.


Table 5 – Private Sector Engagement Elements

USAID	NDPI and PIND
Engage Early and Often	Consistent communication
	Expectation setting
	Openness to feedback
Incentivize and value PSE throughout planning and programming	Inclusiveness of viewpoints
Expand the use of USAID's approach and tools that unlock the potential of the private sector	Organizational humility
	Reputational neutrality
	Capacity building
Build and act on the evidence of what works and what does not in PSE	Data-driven dialogue

Source: USAID Private-Sector Engagement Strategy, 2018; NDPI/PIND Partnership Manual, 2018²³



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The Niger Delta Context and History of NDPI and PIND

Chevron's Corporate Social Enterprise Learning Trajectory

Before its social enterprise investment and subsequent programming in Nigeria, Chevron implemented successful partnership initiatives in Indonesia and Angola. Both initiatives, the Chevron Aceh Recovery Initiative and the Angola Partnerships Initiative (API), in collaboration with the local USAID Mission, surfaced insights that informed Chevron's eventual approach in Nigeria.

In 2004, Chevron invested \$10 million dollars for tsunami and earthquake recovery in Indonesia, focusing on support for community priorities such as small enterprise development, vocational training, infrastructure and school rehabilitation, and the construction of a new polytechnic institution. One Chevron official described the approach as highly participatory, cautioning [not to confuse consultative approaches with truly participatory ones](#).²⁴ Chevron acted quickly in the wake of the crises to build confidence and trust with their Indonesian partners. Throughout implementation of the Aceh Recovery Initiative, Chevron [planned for project sustainability](#) after their exit via close coordination with national and local government colleagues.²⁵ This commitment to sustainability was later echoed by a Nigerian Chevron staff member, "Our emphasis is on sustainability. Before we do any intervention, we think about an exit strategy. Our exit strategy is our entry strategy."²⁶

API served as a training ground for Chevron as a partner to USAID. API began in 2002 and ran for almost a decade. It ended due to the combination of the departure of an instrumental API staff member, who had been a driving force in the partnership, and the arrival of new USAID Mission staff, who were skeptical about working with international oil companies (IOCs) and the private sector. However, USAID officials in Washington described API with great enthusiasm, calling it "the poster child for Global Development Alliances" and one of the Agency's "first wins for major corporate private-public partnerships (PPPs)."²⁷ Chevron invested \$25 million dollars, with USAID contributing \$16.8 million. Together, Chevron and USAID focused on agriculture development, banking, microfinance, and institution building in five priority geographies across the country. The projects with the greatest overall impact were those that contributed to income generation and improved livelihoods.²⁸

The API partnership model was impactful, as [Chevron and USAID had high levels of buy-in, commitment to partnership goals, and were dedicated to true co-creation of content](#).


One senior Chevron official described it as deep partnership, "When NGOs came into the room, they couldn't tell who the Chevron staff were and who the USAID staff were because we were aligned in our thinking."²⁹ An early exercise in [operational empathy](#) had profound ripple effects on the strength of the partnership. Key leaders from USAID and Chevron briefly switched organizational cultures and shadowed a colleague from the other organization to better understand their institutional perspectives on opportunities and constraints. This deepened their understanding and appreciation for what each other could contribute while reinforcing open-mindedness.

The Niger Delta

The Niger Delta region of Nigeria is abundant in oil and gas resources, with its petroleum export accounting for 86% of the country's total export revenue.³⁰ However, the region is plagued by instability, endemic poverty, and corruption. As a result of high unemployment rates and a youth bulge, criminal and militant elements have emerged.³¹ Even after the amnesty program and ceasefire declaration in 2009, tensions continue to loom in the Niger Delta. This presents barriers to improved human security and operational challenges for donors and private companies. 2016's crippling strategic attacks on oil production acted as a reminder of the risks associated with working in the region.³²

Social spending has made little difference in the region's economic wellness. Indeed, development in the region has been largely neglected, leaving it one of the poorest regions in the world. More than 70% of its roughly 32 million inhabitants live on an average of less than \$2 a day.³³ The large disparity between the wealth of resources and the impoverishment of the people in the area is one of the leading indicators of insecurity in the Niger Delta. However, it also presents a business opportunity for the private sector to have a consequential impact on development and peace in the region, to the benefit of both communities and companies.

Figure 3 – The Niger Delta



Source: Chevron, n.d.; National Bureau of Statistics, 2019; Government of Nigeria, 2012; Igboke, 2017; Offshore Technology, n.d.; Rigzone, 2003; Security Exchange Commission, 2009; Wood Mackenzie, 2019.³⁴



“In the Niger Delta, Chevron saw the human rights challenges, environmental challenges, and corruption their peers were facing. It was made clear to a diverse set of company officials that additional tools and approaches were needed to stay the course, but also to thrive... The Niger Delta was a very difficult place to do business and Chevron wanted to stay and see it through the long haul, so Chevron was proactive in thinking through what needed to happen.”

– Former Chevron Official³⁵

Chevron is a leading private sector partner with USAID, not only among IOCs, but also within other types of PPPs featuring companies such as Microsoft and Coca-Cola.³⁶ By comparison, other extractive companies such as Exxon, BP, Shell, and ConocoPhillips rank much lower.³⁷ Chevron's partnerships profile with USAID also stands out in size and duration. Compared to the 90% of USAID's PPPs that end within 5 years, NDPI/PIND's partnership has continued for nearly 10 years.

Chevron's Fenceline Communities

In 2005, Chevron's production facilities in the Niger Delta were damaged or destroyed by ethnic violence plaguing the region. In an effort to engage communities in participatory conflict mitigation and sustainable development to help stabilize areas near their operations, Chevron created the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU). Signed by the company, state governments, and community clusters, the GMOUs incentivized communities toward peace by providing funding for economic and social development that was controlled by the communities themselves. [Communities were rewarded with funding bonuses](#) if there were no disruptions to Chevron's operations in their areas.


“The GMOU process established guiding principles of partnership, transparency, accountability, sustainability assurance, peace building, and project monitoring and evaluation. With this collaborative approach, people discovered common bonds... ‘It accentuated what united them and downplayed what divided them.’”
– Chevron Roots of Change³⁸

Chevron is also involved in the implementation of the GMOUs.

Despite local successes of the GMOUs, regional risks remained. Elsewhere in the Niger Delta, militant groups were trading in oil futures by manipulating the price of oil by blowing up pipelines.³⁹ At the height of the violence in the Niger Delta, pipeline attacks compromised Nigeria's oil production by approximately 30%, significantly impacting the national treasury and oil company revenues.⁴⁰

In 2009, unconditional amnesty was offered by then President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua to all militants in the Niger Delta who had been violently demanding resource control and development investment. This presented Chevron with a window of opportunity to invest for change and stability in the region. Chevron began to consider how social, economic, and conflict dynamics in the Niger Delta beyond their fenceline operations might affect future business. This led to the design of a novel implementation platform capable of tackling poverty and conflict in the region more proactively.⁴¹

Figure 4 – NDPI/PIND Timeline



Moving Beyond the Fenceline: The Niger Delta as a Regional System

In 2010, Chevron launched the sister foundations of NDPI and PIND with an initial \$50 million dollar investment, as the company's third social enterprise initiative in Nigeria. Founded on the goal of securing lasting stability for the region, NDPI/PIND focused on the interrelated goals of market-based economic development and peace building. In order to remove further barriers to peace and growth, NDPI/PIND also included goals for capacity building, analysis, and advocacy to support its work in the Niger Delta.⁴² Their overarching market-driven approach is aimed to sustainably build the capacities of market actors to create jobs and other economic opportunities. With a mission "to build partnerships for peace and equitable economic development in the Niger Delta,"⁴³ NDPI/PIND's partnership-based strategy laid the foundation for its joint projects with USAID, and later other donors.

A senior Chevron executive involved in NDPI/PIND's design noted, "the business case for NDPI was around the [Government of Nigeria's] petroleum industry bill that would require IOCs to put more money into Government development programs via the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)." At the time, the NDDC was requiring oil companies operating in the Niger Delta to invest 3% of their total annual onshore and offshore budget into Government of Nigeria directed development programs.

From the beginning, Chevron sought a "longer term, bottom-up approach that employed a balanced understanding of meeting people where they are."⁴⁴ It also emphasized "open-mindedness in leveraging other's [donors] perspectives."⁴⁵

Unlike Chevron's other social investments in Nigeria, it also focused on the intersection of complex conflict and economic dynamics across the Niger Delta in all nine states, not just the three where Chevron operates.

PIND was founded as a Nigerian non-profit. Its operational heart is located in Warri, Delta State, and Port Harcourt, Rivers State, supported by an administrative office in Abuja. PIND receives funding, oversight, and support from the U.S.-based foundation NDPI, headquartered in Washington, D.C. Although there are two separate non-profit foundations, each with its own governing board, NDPI and PIND work seamlessly together to realize the shared vision of achieving sustainable peace and development among communities in the Niger Delta. NDPI operates as the strategic partner, elevating Chevron's work in the Niger Delta and engaging in policy with donors at their headquarters. PIND is the implementing partner embedded in local communities, co-investing and implementing with other donors. Chevron's business unit in Nigeria remains separate from NDPI/PIND and oversees the other corporate social enterprise investments in the region, such as the GMoUs and their deep-water development initiative.

In a region more populous than many other African countries, even the relatively large size of NDPI's investment is just a drop in the bucket. NDPI/PIND was aware of this need from its founding: "We need a massive coalition to solve that problem. We can't solve that on our own... We brought in USAID to help."⁴⁶ At the time, USAID was only operational in limited non-volatile states in the Niger Delta, but Chevron's assessment of the needs and the windows for opportunity convinced the Agency to expand into the region, in close partnership with NDPI/PIND.

NDPI and PIND's founding coincided with the launch of a partnership with USAID for CSO capacity building under the project Advocacy, Awareness and Civic Empowerment (ADVANCE) in 2011. The networks, capacity, and credibility gained through this partnership contributed to NDPI/PIND's rapid growth into the fulcrum convener for peace and development in the Niger Delta it is today.

By the end of 2012, NDPI/PIND launched a second partnership with USAID for value chain development—Maximizing Agricultural Revenue and Key Enterprises in Targeted Sites (MARKETS) II, convened the first Niger Delta Development Forum (NDDF), and launched two of its own programs for capacity building and development innovation—CAPABLE and MODEL.⁴⁷ Since then, the NDDF has served as an important annual summit for government, civil society, and private sector actors to pursue development and policy change in the region.



In the following year, NDPI/PIND and USAID launched a third collaborative project—Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy, and Development (LEAD). NDPI/PIND also entered the peace and conflict mitigation space with two new initiatives: Partners for Peace (P4P) and NDLink. P4P became a leading network of groups and individuals in the Niger Delta to support peace building and mitigate conflict, while NDLink remains a central online platform for coordination, capacity building, communication, and partnership building for development actors in the Niger Delta.⁴⁸ With the completion of ADVANCE in late 2013, NDPI/PIND and USAID initiated a follow-on in early 2014, Strengthening Advocacy for Civic Engagement (SACE), their fourth partnership.



PIND continued to grow through these partnerships and expand its reach throughout the Niger Delta. 2017 brought two new watershed partnerships: the Niger Delta Youth Employment Pathways program with the Ford Foundation and a collaborative value chain study with the United Kingdom Department for International Development's (DFID) MADE program, which had been operating in the Niger Delta since 2013.⁴⁹ These partnerships signal the gradual achievement of NDPI/PIND's goal of crowding in other donors to help address the complex challenges still facing the Niger Delta.

Since 2010, NDPI has catalyzed over \$100 million in additional investments into the Niger Delta, steering States in the region to develop long-term plans for sustainable development, leveraging partnerships and making way for other development actors to enter the historically fragile region.⁵⁰ Working in partnership with over 500 local organizations, NDPI/PIND's programming has supported increased productivity of 400,000 farmers and 5,000 micro, small, and medium enterprises in the agricultural sector, fostered a network of over 9,000 peace actors, and helped to mitigate hundreds of conflicts across the region.⁵¹ The most mature of NDPI/PIND's programs, moving toward independent sustainability, are its aquaculture value chain development, peacebuilding networks, and CSO networks.⁵² NDPI/PIND's early warning and response system, backed by robust data analysis on conflict in the Niger Delta serve as the go-to conflict data source for government officials, media, academia, and peace actors both within and outside of the Niger Delta, as well as globally.⁵³

NDPI and PIND have played an important and unique role in bridging the private sector, government, development actors, local organizations, and citizens in the Niger Delta.⁵⁴ Because of the mistrust between these actors and vastly different organizational cultures, few other organizations have been able to navigate this space as successfully. NDPI/PIND's partnerships in the Niger Delta have built the foundation for multi-stakeholder networks of donors, CSOs, and private sector entities communicating and collaborating to improve the stability and development of the region.⁵⁵

USAID's Interests and Equities as a Partner

USAID's goals for Nigeria have shifted over time in response to crises facing the country. The most recent USAID/Nigeria Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) established its goal as "reduced extreme poverty in a more stable, democratic Nigeria."⁵⁶

Despite this sweeping goal, addressing health challenges have remained a central focus in every iteration of USAID/Nigeria strategy documents for almost three decades, and the funding priorities have mirrored the consistency and pervasiveness of these issues.

Table 6 – USAID's Goals for Nigeria Over Time

	USAID Document	Nigeria Country Strategic Program 1993-2000	Nigeria Program Overview 2000	Nigeria Country Strategic Plan 2004-2009	Nigeria Strategy 2010-2013	Nigerian CDCS 2015-2020
GOALS	Health	Family planning Improve morbidity and mortality rates Sexually-transmitted disease control		Reduce impact of HIV/AIDS	Improve governance and its response to: • HIV/AIDS • Healthcare	
	Government		Development of policy, legal framework for government transition	Strengthen foundation for democratic governance	Increase government transparency and accountability Improve governance	Improve and strengthen good governance
	Economy	Create productive society to contribute to economic growth		Improve livelihoods: focus agricultural sector on value added commodities	Enhance economic growth and trade	Further economic development, broaden and inclusive growth
	Security				Improve peace and security	Enhance stability
	Population		Deliver services to communities	Increase use and quality of social sector services Focus on challenges facing youth population	Invest in people Improve governance and its response to: • Poverty • Unemployment • Education	Expand opportunity Reduce poverty
Assistance (average annual spending per sector under each strategy)⁷⁷						
	Health + Population	no reported data	\$36m	\$97m	\$219m	\$244m
	Economic Growth	no reported data	\$10.9m	\$5.22m	\$2.22m	N/A
	Governance	no reported data	\$13.8m	\$16.75m	\$22.75m	\$33.5m
	Education	no reported data	\$5m	\$5.16m	\$9.4m	\$25.5m
	Administrative Costs	no reported data	\$3.83m	\$7.88m	\$18.5m	\$24.75m
	Infrastructure	no reported data	\$1.18m	\$465K	\$1.53m	\$8.73m
	Agriculture	no reported data	\$1.47m	\$4.28m	\$11.68m	\$18.9m
	Emergency Response	no reported data	\$36K	N/A	-\$230k	\$204m
	Other	no reported data	\$18K	\$394K	\$867K	-\$254K

Source: USAID/Nigeria Country Strategic Program 1993-2000; USAID/Nigeria Program Overview 2000; USAID/Nigeria Country Strategic Plan 2004-2009; USAID/Nigeria Strategy 2010-2013; Nigerian CDCS 2015-2020



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
and



Over the last twenty years, USAID has gradually added other development and strategic objectives to include economic growth, governance, and agriculture, but a substantial portion of the budget remains allocated to the health sector.⁵⁷ This leaves a relatively small budget to adequately tackle other

development challenges. The most recent USAID/Nigeria CDCS document recognizes this disparity and looks to fill gaps in funding by leveraging partnerships with the private sector in order to effectively address the other factors contributing to poverty, conflict, and lack of development.


Figure 5 – USAID Assistance to Nigeria by Sector Over Time



Source: U.S. Foreign Aid by Country Foreign Aid Explorer, USAID/Nigeria Country Strategic Program 1993-2000, USAID/Nigeria Program Overview 2000, USAID/Nigeria Country Strategic Plan 2004-2009, USAID/Nigeria Strategy 2010-2013, Nigerian CDCS 2015-202

Operationalizing the Model: NDPI/PIND's Partnerships with USAID

Since its founding, NDPI/PIND has partnered with USAID on four projects strengthening civil society, agricultural practices, and economic growth in the Niger Delta.



In all four cases, NDPI and PIND engaged USAID to co-invest activities in the Niger Delta and actively participated in joint management and learning during implementation.



Table 7 - Summary of USAID-PIND Projects

	1 ADVANCE	2 SACE
Timeline	May 2005 - Mar. 2013 PIND Partnership: 2011 - 2013	Jan. 2014 - Jan. 2019
Budget	Total: \$13.5 million PIND: \$800,000 Total obligated: \$5.3 million Total to PIND Partners in Niger Delta: \$510,295	Total: \$19.2 million PIND: \$3 million Plus PIND in-kind support of \$500,000
Partner Engagement Type	Donor-led design Private sector invitation for regional expansion Co-creation of expansion parameters	Co-created design Jointly managed
Implementation Partner(s)		 
Objectives	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strengthen the capacity of CSOs for program and financial management and advocacy 2. Strengthen public-private partnerships to fight corruption through public oversight agencies and initiatives 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strengthen the capacity and transparency of state and local governments 2. Increase the capacity of local organizations 3. Improve service delivery in basic education and health
Results	<p>Improved local government participatory governance, transparency, and accountability</p> <p>Improved capacity of 7 partner CSOs</p> <p>Launched and grew PIND's presence in the Niger Delta</p> <p>Brought USAID to the Niger Delta</p>	<p>In the Niger Delta, improved capacity of 44 CSOs and the networks of 54 CSOs</p> <p>Improved market development to bring more income to the region</p> <p>Partners successfully advocated for passage of numerous policies, bills, and laws</p>
Synergies	USAID's tools and experience plus PIND's regional knowledge and reach	<p>PIND's private sector knowledge plus USAID's capacity building expertise</p> <p>Effective joint monitoring, evaluation, and learning</p> <p>Co-locating implementing partner staff at PIND office in Port Harcourt</p>
Challenges	<p>Unclear partner reporting chains and mismatched report deadlines</p> <p>PIND under-represented in USAID branding</p>	<p>Uneven branding and sharing credit for outcomes</p> <p>USAID down-played PIND contribution on international stage while PIND down played USAID support domestically</p>
Implications	Synergistic partnership but need more clarity and cooperation on communication and reporting strategies	Complementary skills and expertise but branding, reporting, and sharing in rewards is still an issue

	3 LEAD	4 MARKETS II
Timeline	Nov. 2009 - Aug. 2013 (Bauchi and Sokoto States) 2013 - 2016 expanded to Rivers State 2016 - 2018: expanded to Kano State	Apr. 2012 - Oct. 2015
Budget	Total: \$40 million PIND: \$1 million cash \$2 million in-kind	Total: \$64.9 million Niger Delta Total: \$14.7 million PIND in-kind: \$4.5 million
Partner Engagement Type	Donor-led design Private Sector invitation for regional expansion Co-creation of expansion parameters	Donor-led design with Private Sector consultation Jointly managed
Implementation Partner[s]		
Objectives	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strengthen capacity of CSO networks to advance democracy and good governance 2. Strengthen partnership between CSO-led coalitions and the government for advocacy and monitoring 3. Strengthen public awareness, discourse, and support for key democratic governance 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Alleviate poverty and improve food security through technical support to selected value chains, access to credit, and capacity building 2. Promote sustainable agriculture development via increasing private sector participation and investment
Results	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Strength capacity of partner business membership organizations and CSOs in the Niger Delta to advocate for economic reforms and growth <p>Trained and enabled 429 citizens to engage local councils on budget priorities in Rivers State</p> <p>Improved local CSO capacity for engaging in participatory governance</p> <p>Trained 180 youth on entrepreneurship in agricultural sector</p>	<p>Produced Nigerian Agriculture Enterprise Training Program</p> <p>Greatly improved productivity of various aquaculture and agriculture products</p> <p>Fostered a sustainable cohort of agricultural trainers in the Niger Delta</p> <p>Leveraged deeper government investment in agricultural extension services</p>
Synergies	<p>PIND's local networks plus USAID's capacity building experience</p> <p>Co-locating implementing partner staff at PIND office in Port Harcourt</p>	<p>PIND's local networks and private sector knowledge plus USAID's training curricula</p> <p>Co-locating implementing partner staff at PIND office in Port Harcourt</p> <p>Effective joint analysis and monitoring</p>
Challenges	<p>Inflexible USAID contract could not shift objectives when local context changed</p> <p>Partnership agreement did not include exit clause in the case of impassable road blocks to implementation</p>	<p>USAID's value chain strengthening approach not aligned with PIND's market systems approach</p> <p>USAID and Chemonics staff did not understand market systems approach</p> <p>PIND under-represented in USAID branding</p> <p>Mismatched expectations on speed and type of results</p>
Implications	Partnership agreements need to include room for flexibility as well as clear conditions for premature termination	To ensure smooth and complementary implementation, start with co-creation at the proposal stage

ADVANCE

ADVANCE began in 2005, with the goal of enhancing the “capacity of civil society organizations to effectively engage with the Government of Nigeria...to ensure inclusive, transparent and accountable governance.”⁵⁸ Administered by the implementing partner Pact, ADVANCE worked with twenty CSOs at the national and regional levels and was set to conclude in 2011. In 2011, Pact and NDPI/PIND collaborated to design a cost extension proposal and submitted it to USAID for approval in December 2010.⁵⁹ For ADVANCE, NDPI/PIND committed \$800,000 and USAID matched this with \$510,295.

Chevron’s cooperation with USAID began while NDPI/PIND was still in the early stages of formation. Chevron approached USAID/Nigeria in 2010 to form a partnership for conflict reduction and economic growth in the Niger Delta when it saw a valuable opportunity in ADVANCE’s capacity building activities for its CSOs partners in the Niger Delta. Also, while NDPI/PIND was still in the early stages of formation, ADVANCE supported the capacity building of five partner organizations under Chevron’s Participatory Partnerships for Community Development (PPCD), which worked to build the capacity of regional development committees to implement Chevron’s GMoU activities.⁶⁰ During this time, Pact also hired two staff to provide capacity building support to the Chevron partners as the organizations moved toward closer partnership.⁶¹ Later that year, after NDPI/PIND had been officially founded, ADVANCE expanded its funding to seven more NDPI/PIND partners.

Funding for the extension was granted in April 2011, and NDPI/PIND and Pact agreed to specifically target CSOs focused on economic development, peace, and participatory governance in the Niger Delta. As laid out in the ADVANCE extension proposal, Pact and NDPI/PIND jointly developed a Request for Assistance (RFA) to solicit proposals for partner CSOs in the Niger Delta. Pact then reviewed the 28 proposals for compliance and recommended 14 for technical review. A representative of PIND sat on the technical review committee alongside four Pact staff, which ultimately selected seven CSOs in the Niger Delta to receive sub-grants and capacity building assistance as a part of ADVANCE.⁶²

RESULTS

By the close of the project in 2013, the seven partner CSOs greatly improved their organizational and advocacy capacity in the Niger Delta.⁶³ Combined, they trained a total of 449 individuals in local government participation and economic livelihood skills over the two years of the project.

ADVANCE programming fostered an awareness that the government, and not just oil companies, was responsible for social services and infrastructure. Niger Delta citizens benefited from ADVANCE by gaining a better understanding of the flows of government funds into the region and how better to engage their local representatives to prioritize and advocate for their needs. For example, a citizen transparency initiative launched by the partner CSO Bayelsa Non-Governmental Forum resulted in the passage of an expenditure transparency law. In another case, ADVANCE funding and training enabled the partner Antof

Rural Resource Development Centre to initiate a campaign advocating for the local government area to issue over \$56,000 worth of agricultural grants to farmer associations, as promised under the World Bank FADAMA program.⁶⁴ In so doing, This strengthened economic independence of farmers in the Urue Offong/Oruko local government area. These patterns of [participatory governance, transparency, and accountability](#), largely absent before the project, have continued since the close of ADVANCE.

For [NDPI/PIND](#), ADVANCE brought rapid [high-level visibility and legitimacy](#) through a partnership with USAID, a respected international donor. NDPI/PIND leveraged USAID's national and international networks to expand its reach and launch meetings with state government officials. Through strengthening NDPI/PIND's CSO partners, ADVANCE also worked toward NDPI/PIND's core goals of improving economic development, civil society capacity, and advocacy in the Niger Delta.

For [USAID](#), NDPI/PIND's invitation to partnership offered a [window of opportunity](#) into a volatile and under-developed region of Nigeria in which USAID had previously not been active. USAID also leveraged NDPI/PIND's local networks and contextual knowledge to expand into the Niger Delta. One former Mission Director noted that though the geographical distances were hard, USAID trusted Chevron and NDPI/PIND because they had great people. And, they ensured a steady and constant presence in Abuja to coordinate with the Mission.⁶⁵

Under the PPCD component of the project, prior to NDPI/PIND's founding, five CSOs that partnered with [Chevron](#) in its fenceline communities under GMoUs also received capacity building support. Thus, the gains in civil society capacity and income generation supported the [stability and prosperity](#) of some of the communities closest to Chevron's operations. Additionally, ADVANCE's contributions to broader stability in the Niger Delta indirectly supported the stability of Chevron's work in the region.



Perhaps most importantly, the partnership between NDPI/PIND and USAID proved that investing in development in the Niger Delta was possible and made way for future development partnerships in the region. NDPI/PIND's grounded knowledge and local networks allowed the partnership to establish a quick and lasting presence in the region while USAID's technical expertise and national networks provided the conduits and methods for implementation. The partnership with USAID also demonstrated the immense value capacity building could have for NDPI/PIND's partners in the Niger Delta. [The joint funding allowed ADVANCE to reach more communities than either partner could alone.](#)

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE PARTNERSHIP

As a whole, NDPI/PIND and USAID formed an effective partnership in mutually expanding their horizons for development; USAID expanded into the Niger Delta region, while NDPI/PIND expanded into CSO grants and capacity building. A summary of synergies and challenges is given above in Table 7. Through a shared vision of economic development and stability of the Niger Delta their complementary strengths fit together to fill one another's gaps in experience and reach.

However, communication with partner CSOs, reporting, and branding were noted struggles in the partnership. Partner CSOs did not have clarity on the relationship between USAID (Pact) and NDPI/PIND, which led to confusion in reporting requirements for each donor. Due to differing fiscal years, NDPI/PIND and USAID had different timelines for partner reports, which created stress for both partner CSOs and for NDPI/PIND. Ultimately, partner CSO grant agreements were directly with USAID, so their accountability processes focused toward USAID's reporting needs.

Moreover, NDPI/PIND felt that USAID branding requirements for reports and other publications did not leave room for sufficient visibility of NDPI/PIND as a partner and co-donor.

Financially, delays in NDPI/PIND's obligation of funds to the project created delays in granting awards to partner CSOs in the Niger Delta, as well as delays in related reporting.⁶⁶

Ultimately, NDPI/PIND and USAID determined that the benefits of their partnership outweighed the struggles, and they collaborated on a follow-on project: SACE.





“We needed to improve on how the implementing partners [are] recognizing the relationship between PIND and USAID. Sometimes they have to do [USAID] branding [of their reports, but] we wanted the recognition.”

– PIND Staff⁶⁷

SACE

SACE ran from January 2014 through January 2019, with the goal of strengthening “civil society’s ability to influence the development and implementation of key democratic reforms at the national, state, and local levels.”⁶⁸ SACE sought to build upon the previous work of ADVANCE to expand Nigerian CSOs’ capacity for advocacy and catalyzing participatory democracy. While Niger Delta CSOs benefited from all four components of SACE (see Table 7 above), the fourth component specifically aimed to strengthen Niger Delta CSOs and business membership organizations (BMOs) for inclusive economic reforms and growth. The project leveraged \$19.3 million in combined funds, of which \$3 million and additional in-kind support came from NDPI/PIND. SACE was implemented by Chemonics and its partner Root Change.

PIND and USAID co-created SACE from the outset, drawing on NDPI/PIND’s keen understanding of the needs and opportunities in the Niger Delta. Chemonics maintained an office in the same building as PIND for the duration of the project, facilitating true co-management of SACE. PIND sat on the USAID technical review committee (TEC) that selected Chemonics as the implementing partner, as well as the TEC that selected sub-grant recipients in the Niger Delta. In particular, NDPI/PIND saw an opportunity to strengthen BMOs, which could make valuable contributions to society, governance, and economic growth in the Niger Delta, but were not typically sought out as partners in USAID programming.

SACE extended grants and capacity building to seven CSOs and three BMOs in the Niger Delta, in addition to eight national-level CSOs.⁶⁹ These eighteen anchor organizations led topical civil society clusters, which then led collective advocacy and extended training, mentoring, and sub-grants to other cluster members.

RESULTS

By the end of the five-year project, SACE delivered capacity building to 157 CSOs and 8,759 people nationwide. In the Niger Delta, a total of 44 organizations saw organizational capacity improvements and 54 organizations improved their networks over the life of the project.⁷⁰ These clusters helped to move numerous bills, laws, policies, and administrative procedures through local and state legislative processes, including prompting three Niger Delta state governments to publish their budgets online for the first time ever.⁷¹ SACE also led NDPI/PIND to give an additional year of capacity building support to four fledgling CSOs to prepare them to receive other donor funding.

“Some of those organizations got visibility on the national level and got some other funders... [They got] very big exposure that remote places in the Niger Delta don’t. They are interacting with well-established organizations outside of the Niger Delta... Their confidence levels improved too.”
– PIND Staff⁷²

SACE made great strides in improving citizen awareness of their rights to access public information, particularly financial data, and to participate in public discourse. *As citizens have become better informed, pressure on policymakers has led some government officials to be more responsive to societal demands.* At the same time, SACE training for policymakers helped them to become better informed about the issues under their jurisdiction. In particular, civil society successfully advocated for previously abandoned public works to be completed, to the benefit of all citizens.⁷³ Moreover, NDPI/PIND and USAID were able to leverage the national CSO clusters to *improve national-level disability and extractives policies*, the effects of which reached the Niger Delta. Additionally, the work of the BMO clusters made *significant strides in market development*, bringing more income to the region.

Acknowledging the political economy of the region and the entrenched interests of many political elites, a senior USAID official praised Chevron's investment,

“For me, as an American, it’s incredibly important for a player like Chevron — with a big presence — to accept a degree of responsibility for development impacts... For progressing and improving the lives of the people in the area where they are doing petroleum operations because the political class will not! ...They put structures in place despite government’s [historic] non-performance and lack of integrity.”
— Senior USAID Official⁷⁴

Successes for NDPI/PIND's partner organizations in the Niger Delta were also successes for NDPI/PIND. SACE anchor organizations and their multitude of partners *improved their institutional capacity*, and capacity to network, advocate, influence policy-makers, and become sector leaders in civil society, *setting them up as capable recipients of direct funding from USAID and other major donors.*⁷⁵ Eight of these have collectively received over \$3 million in funding from DFID and other donors.⁷⁶ This helps to fulfil NDPI/PINDs goal of drawing more development resources to the Niger Delta. Additionally, the anchor and cluster model for advocacy has inspired former partners to found new clusters around extractives, education, and other issues, outside of SACE support.⁷⁷ Organizations that received SACE training also maintain informal networks of peers who were trained together for collaboration and support, all adding to the sustainability of SACE's work in the Niger Delta.

“Each time I have a program, the first ones I look for are the ones that PIND trained with me. They do the same. If I want to do some work in Delta State, I know who to call, from colleagues in those programs.”
— Partner CSO Staff⁷⁸

“We establish a joint monitoring of finance, procurement, program, and evaluation teams, because before the grantee runs off with deliverables, if they aren’t doing what they are supposed to be doing, our visit helps to bring them back to track. It also helps to inform our future engagements with them and other partners.”

– PIND Staff⁸⁰

A black and white photograph of a woman with long, wavy hair, smiling warmly at the camera. She is holding a large white sign in front of her. The sign has handwritten text in black marker. The background is slightly blurred, showing what appears to be an indoor setting with a bookshelf. The overall mood is positive and professional.

I AM A PROUD
BUSINESS
SERVICE
PROVIDER

Outcomes of the SACE partnership with NDPI/PIND supported USAID's "USAID Forward" initiative, which seeks to increase the number of grants given directly to local organizations.⁷⁹ Moreover, NDPI/PIND's continued capacity building support to Niger Delta CSOs supports the [sustainability of USAID's work](#) in the region, producing more capable CSOs that will continue to pursue local improvements in the Niger Delta.

SACE aimed to contribute to [more accountable and transparent governance](#), which would contribute to [regional stability](#) in the Niger Delta. The many bills and policies passed in the region, thanks to partner organizations, seem to be strengthening local governance. A more stable and transparent Niger Delta would certainly benefit the smooth continuation of [Chevron's](#) operations.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE PARTNERSHIP

Branding and public communications

continued to be a point of friction between NDPI/PIND and the USAID (Chemonics) team. Implementing partners tended to follow USAID branding policies, which often did not carry recognition for NDPI/PIND. At the local level, press releases highlighted NDPI/PIND's support for SACE while downplaying or failing to mention USAID's contributions. In USAID press releases at the international level, the reverse was true. USAID and NDPI/PIND did not seem to collaborate or communicate on their media relations strategies.

However, NDPI/PIND and USAID successfully developed [strategies for joint learning](#). NDPI/PIND took part in all regular project reviews alongside Chemonics, including when external evaluators were brought on for mid-term and final evaluations. NDPI/PIND and Chemonics staff co-designed the review criteria and then were debriefed on the results so that both could cross-examine the findings before they were sent to USAID. Chemonics and PIND staff also formed joint monitoring teams that took quarterly trips into the field to check in on processes and progress of sub-grant partners, leveraging the expertise of each team.

In order to alleviate some of the stressors of having different fiscal year reporting deadlines, Chemonics and NDPI/PIND also developed a joint monitoring template. However, extrapolation was often necessary when reporting deadlines did not align with the most recent monitoring data.

Financially, sub-grantees complained of [mismatched funding release schedules](#) when delays in USAID funding halted the smooth release of funds. This, in turn, delayed partner organizations' implementation.

PIND brought its keen understanding of the power of local level private sector engagement to the partnership, through BMO engagement, while USAID brought its deeply developed expertise on capacity building. These complementary skills, knowledge, and resources resulted in outcomes neither could have achieved alone.

LEAD

Like ADVANCE, LEAD began outside of the Niger Delta and later established a presence in the region at NDPI/PIND's invitation. Implemented by Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International, LEAD began in November 2009 in the northern states of Bauchi and Sokoto. It expanded into Rivers State from 2013 to 2016 on a new cost extension, concluding nationally in September 2018.⁸¹ LEAD leveraged a total of \$40 million, of which NDPI/PIND contributed \$1 million, also providing \$2 million in in-kind support.

Seeing the successes of LEAD elsewhere in Nigeria, NDPI/PIND invited USAID to bring the project to the Niger Delta in 2013. Originally intended to end in 2014, USAID granted a cost extension of LEAD to cover its expansion into Rivers State and continuation in northern Nigeria through 2018. NDPI/PIND then undertook assessments to determine the best locations for LEAD in the Niger Delta.

LEAD sought to boost local government capacity, service delivery, transparency, fiscal management, and transparency, as well as increase the capacity of local CSOs to engage with their government. LEAD also broadened the scope to include local economic development in Rivers State, where it worked with the Local Government Councils in Akuku, Toru, Khana, and Okrika. The project later added three more Local Government Areas, bringing the total to six. There, NDPI/PIND and RTI provided trainings on public expenditure tracking, tax processes, and waste management. In addition, the partnership facilitated meetings between Local Government

Councils and community members to set budget priorities and mentored government officials on improvements to service delivery. However, a change in local government officials in Rivers State in 2016 halted the progress of LEAD and led NDPI/PIND to pull out of the partnership. This left USAID to continue the project elsewhere without NDPI/PIND's support for the last two years of implementation.

RESULTS

Nationwide, LEAD supported the training of 5,737 government officials—all of whom committed to improved government effectiveness—on best practices in governance, accounting, and service delivery. In Rivers State, 429 citizens met with their respective local councils to set budget priorities. Once the budgets were passed, NDPI/PIND and RTI helped local governments to establish revenue improvement plans and expenditure tracking. LEAD also helped to strengthen the capacity of local CSOs to engage in governance, including improved advocacy, public expenditure tracking, participatory budgeting, as well as general organizational capacity skills.⁸²

For [citizens](#) of LEAD's six local government areas in Rivers State, LEAD provided an opportunity for government accountability and transparency—for their voices to be heard. It was hoped that this would lead to improved service delivery and fiscal management, but a change in elected officials who were not responsive to constituent needs stagnated this progress.


However, the economic development component of the Rivers State program trained 180 youth on entrepreneurship, and 25% of those youth continued working in agricultural enterprises well after the program ended. Thus, LEAD **helped to ease youth unemployment** and enabled small gains in economic growth in the communities in which it worked.⁸³

NDPI/PIND gained from USAID's previous experience elsewhere in Nigeria during the first five years of the project. During that time, USAID and RTI had refined their goals and processes to effectively improve local governance, the learnings from which were applied in the Niger Delta.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE PARTNERSHIP

The most notable point of friction between USAID and NDPI/PIND during LEAD resulted from a shift in local context and **the flexibility of each partner to adapt—or not**. The elected officials who had been working with LEAD for improved transparency and government effectiveness were replaced by government appointed caretaker committees who did not represent the local communities. The project tried to engage with civil servants but found that they did not have the necessary leverage to affect the change in LEAD's objectives.

USAID benefitted from NDPI/PIND's existing local connections and convening power in Rivers State to smoothly implement the project. There is less evidence that LEAD contributed direct benefits to **Chevron's** operations in the Niger Delta due to its limited regional scope and short timeframe. It is possible that Chevron may have received positive recognition in the LEAD communities where NDPI/PIND played a visible role.



Because LEAD was no longer able to achieve its objectives in Rivers State, NDPI/PIND pulled out of the partnership in 2016. This created conflict with USAID, as their original agreement did not include a clause for dissolving the partnership.

“USAID wanted to stay to the end of the project with the national project, but PIND said that [LEAD was] not achieving the objective, and the value for money was not there... so they had to pull out of the project abruptly.” – PIND Staff⁸⁴

MARKETS II

MARKETS II was launched in 2012 with the goal of promoting “sustainable agriculture development via increasing private sector participation and investment..., raising income, increasing employment, attaining food security, and reducing poverty.”⁸⁵ Implemented by Chemonics, the five-year project leveraged \$64.9 million nationwide, including a joint \$14.7 million from USAID and NDPI/PIND in the Niger Delta. NDPI/PIND additionally supplied \$4.5 million in in-kind contributions.

As a jointly funded project, NDPI/PIND staff sat on the technical review committee to select the implementing partner for MARKETS II. Once selected, Chemonics and NDPI/PIND worked together to design interventions for the Niger Delta. However, MARKETS II was not truly co-created with NDPI/PIND. Instead, USAID shared some intervention ideas with NDPI/PIND to check for alignment. Once the methods had NDPI/PIND’s approval, USAID instructed Chemonics to proceed. NDPI/PIND then invited Chemonics staff to set up an office in PIND’s office building in Warri. This co-location would make way for fluid communication and cooperation throughout the project.

“We sent some intervention ideas to [PIND leadership] to look at it, to make sure it addressed their objectives, and then they gave us the go-ahead to do it. It would be better to co-create. If the partner is going to put in money like PIND is doing, then we should sit down together to make sure we have the same expectations and objectives, and that we do it in a way that meets our mutual expectations.”

– USAID Foreign Service Officer⁸⁶

Before implementation began, NDPI/PIND shared its previous value chain analysis. The project began with joint analysis of markets across the Niger Delta and how those markets might link with the rest of the country and the region at large. From there, NDPI/PIND and USAID (Chemonics) divided up sectoral responsibilities across all nine states in the Niger Delta region. For example, USAID chose to invest in cocoa value chains while NDPI/PIND did not. USAID’s expertise in training led them to take the lead in capacity building, while NDPI/PIND took the lead at managing relationships with private sector partners. In addition to co-investing in partner organizations in the Niger Delta, NDPI/PIND also directly implemented training and other aspects of the project.

MARKETS II provided technical support to agricultural value chains, credit, capacity building, and other activities expanding and strengthening opportunities for rural livelihoods, such as productivity improvement, value-added processing, commercialization of agriculture, and technology adoption. MARKETS II helped smallholder farmers shift their mindsets and processes from agriculture as subsistence to agriculture as a business, using a demand-driven approach.⁸⁷ While USAID and Chemonics utilized a value chain approach to the project that sought to strengthen various aspects of the value chain, NDPI/PIND managed its partners through a market systems approach, which sought to remove barriers and strengthen the broader market system itself. USAID focused on training individuals within value chains to better fulfill their roles, while NDPI/PIND

focused on removing obstacles in the market systems and fostering self-sustaining local market development. For example, NDPI/PIND sought incentives to foster agribusiness trainers among the local private sector, who could continue training as a business after the project finished. These trainers took much longer to cultivate than USAID's method of bringing in international trainers. While USAID was able to reach many more farmers and small businesses within a shorter timeframe, NDPI/PIND prioritized enabling market forces for sustainability. In some other ways, however, NDPI/PIND was able to complement USAID's approach by providing market analysis and identifying constraints along value chains.⁸⁸

In addition to different conceptual approaches, NDPI/PIND and USAID approached training differently. USAID saw that bringing in international and national consultants as trainers was a faster way to reach wider populations. Conversely, NDPI/PIND preferred to teach local private sector individuals to be trainers, who could continue to offer their training services long after MARKETS II had finished.

The program utilized extension agents from state government agricultural development projects as well as private sector actors in agricultural value chains (seed producers, fertilizer companies, farm tool suppliers, etc.) to train and strengthen farmer associations. These lead farmers, in turn, trained farmers in their networks, who then informally shared their skills and knowledge with neighbors.⁸⁹


In the Niger Delta, MARKETS II expanded into beekeeping and trained a cadre of local consultants to provide capacity and assessments to farmer associations and CSOs.



RESULTS

MARKETS II trained 619,285 individuals, who leveraged nearly \$1.8 billion in sales of MARKETS II commodities nationwide.⁹⁰ Although banks were hesitant to loan to smallholder farmers, the project assisted rural businesses and farmers to gain access to finance. MARKETS II logged 822,763 rural and agricultural loans disbursed to small and medium-sized enterprises, including farmers, which totaled \$269,178,337.⁹¹ Most strikingly, participants reported significant gains in productivity across all the crops that MARKETS II supported (see Figure 6).

Figure 6 – MARKETS II Productivity Improvements




PIND and Chemonics jointly developed the aquaculture training program based on an earlier initiative developed for crops that was used elsewhere in the country by Chemonics. PIND, Chemonics and MADE adopted the aquaculture training for poultry.

Partnering with local private sector entities resulted in increased demand for improved seeds and other agricultural inputs, as well as agricultural advisory services that the partners provide. In addition, it enhanced farmer capacity to produce quality outputs and expanded market opportunities both for farmers and for partner businesses. Further, of the 50 agricultural service providers trained to be trainers, 20 are still offering training services. These lasting linkages with economic benefits for both farmers and private sector partners have contributed to the sustainability of the project.⁹²

In addition to the [growth in capacity, productivity, networks, access to credit, and income](#) for farmers and their communities in the Niger Delta, [citizens](#) also benefited from support to the Cross River State commissioner of agriculture. There, NDPI/PIND and Chemonics supported the development of the “Cross River State Development Goals and Key Performance Indicators Agriculture Plan.”⁹³ Government engagement in agricultural extension services, supported by private sector actors engaged as service providers and trainers, has built a lasting infrastructure for market systems in the Niger Delta.

For [NDPI/PIND](#), MARKETS II provided another opportunity to [strengthen its partner CSOs](#) as well as work toward its goals of economic growth, strengthening market linkages, and improving agricultural productivity in the Niger Delta. NDPI/PIND benefitted from the MARKETS II tools and methodologies for training and capacity building that NDPI/PIND collaborated with Chemonics to adapt to the products and markets most important to the region. NDPI/PIND was also able to learn from USAID’s significant experience elsewhere in value chain development and how best to support cassava and aquaculture farmers. In addition, MARKETS II [revealed potential areas for expansion in NDPI/PIND’s own programming](#). As a result of the partnership with USAID, NDPI/PIND recognized the importance of the cocoa value chain in the Niger Delta and took over the cocoa support programming for the region.⁹⁴ This has grown to become one of NDPI/PIND’s current value chains in the Niger Delta.

For [USAID](#), NDPI/PIND’s market development approach provided both consistent [attention to sustainability](#) as well as market analysis that helped to adjust programming in real-time. NDPI/PIND’s deep connections in the Niger Delta thanks to its P4P network, CSO networks facilitated through CAPABLE, and the various USAID-NDPI/PIND civil society strengthening projects [allowed USAID to reach particularly difficult areas](#) in Rivers State and Delta State that would not have been penetrable without NDPI/PIND’s assistance. During MARKETS II, NDPI/PIND also convened the DEMAND Alliance Group of other international donors in the Niger Delta, which [facilitated alignment of approaches and objectives, better sharing of information and coordination of overlapping initiatives](#).⁹⁵



Chevron benefited from MARKETS II when the program provided technical and business training to 40 youth who were a part of Chevron's cassava enterprise project near its fenceline communities in Ondo State.⁹⁶ Also, Chevron likely benefited indirectly, as Niger Delta farmers could provide local food sources in its operating areas. As NDPI/PIND continued to deliver good results as a recognized partner of Chevron, [public perceptions of Chevron have remained relatively positive](#)—in stark contrast to other oil companies in the Niger Delta.

PIND and USAID's cooperation in the Niger Delta during MARKETS II enabled them to jointly reach a wider range of beneficiaries than they could have reached alone. NDPI/PIND's analysis helped the program expand into poultry and women's beekeeping, while Chemonics' experience with cocoa elsewhere in the country brought it to NDPI/PIND's attention as a valuable area for engagement. With a deep understanding of private sector operations due to its relationship with Chevron, NDPI/PIND was an ideal partner to help USAID communicate and engage productively with private sector actors in the Niger Delta's agricultural value chains. Moreover, NDPI/PIND's rooted commitment to markets development in the Niger Delta ensured sustained and sustainable results in the region for USAID.

Many of the MARKETS II partners have sustained their agribusiness work and continue to look to NDPI/PIND for guidance and support.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE PARTNERSHIP

Co-locating Chemonics staff in the same building with PIND proved to be a boon for MARKETS II as well. It facilitated joint planning, learning, regular communication, and a unified front for partners and beneficiaries in the Niger Delta. NDPI/PIND's deep commitment to the region, clarity of mission, and deeply engaged, collaborative leadership made them an easy partner for Chemonics to work with.

Joint and complementary analysis was a strength of the partnership in MARKETS II. In some cases, NDPI/PIND and Chemonics would design and carry out analysis together. In other cases, each partner would fund and undertake analyses best suited to their comparative advantage. Also, in some cases Chemonics and NDPI/PIND supplied separate research for joint analysis. This analysis was used to effectively divide responsibilities based on comparative expertise. For example, NDPI/PIND complemented USAID's expertise on aquaculture with a game-changing study on how to reduce the cost of fish feed for farmers, the results of which were incorporated into MARKETS II programming.

“The PIND and USAID market group worked so seamless together. You didn't even know the differences between the different staff. We shared vehicles, trainings, meetings.”

– PIND Staff⁹⁷

Likewise, regular **joint monitoring** occurred at least quarterly if not monthly between the relevant managers from PIND and Chemonics to discuss progress, any issues, what each


partner had contributed recently, and any upcoming events. This facilitated smooth communication and joint understanding of the status of MARKETS II.

However, because NDPI/PIND contributed its funding to USAID, which then paid their implementing partner, Chemonics remained more responsive to USAID's needs than NDPI/PIND's. In particular, **reports and other branded materials** produced by Chemonics for U.S. and international audiences heavily featured USAID with less emphasis on NDPI/PIND as an equal partner. Meanwhile, at the local level, an influential state government official interviewed perceived PIND as the lead implementer with USAID as a supporting funder, rather than a co-creator and co-investor.⁹⁸

Technically, numerous PIND staff interviewed cited a **mismatch in approaches between USAID's value chain strengthening and PIND's market systems approach** as a major point of friction between the organizations. NDPI/PIND advocated for market systems as a more sustainable approach, targeting systems change over number of beneficiaries reached. NDPI/PIND's market systems approach sought to build the capabilities of market actors to create sustained jobs in the agricultural sector, all along the value chain. USAID (Chemonics) instead focused on value chain strengthening through training farmers on improved production methods to meet the needs of processing businesses. Their divergence is most clearly illustrated through training practices.

While NDPI/PIND trained and incentivized companies in the value chain to become agricultural trainers as a business, USAID brought in international trainers, who then encouraged farmers to pass on what they had learned to neighbors. While this method reached a far greater number of individual farmers during the implementation period, many of the businesses trained by NDPI/PIND continue to provide agricultural training today.

NDPI/PIND felt that, because Chemonics' accountability was primarily to USAID, they could not influence the company to use a market systems approach instead of USAID's preferred value chain strengthening. At the start of MARKETS II, USAID did not fully understand NDPI/PIND's market systems approach and instead leaned on more familiar approaches. Although USAID could have modified the contract to align with a market systems approach, in the end it did not.



“There was a difference in perspectives between PIND and USAID in MARKETS II... In the future, USAID needs to make sure somebody who manages the activity fully understands it... That inhibited our ability to fully utilize the partnership for the outcomes.”

– USAID Foreign Service Officer⁹⁹

Similarly, differing approaches led to [different reporting metrics](#). There was tension around the expected speed of results. USAID had a limited timeline within MARKETS II, while NDPI/PIND's timeline of influence in the Niger Delta was much more long-term. This was reflected in each organization's preferred indicators. NDPI/PIND felt that the USAID method of counting outreach numbers through value chains, which is a preferred reporting method to Congress, did not fully capture the impact of their work on the market as a whole. On the other hand, USAID felt that improved export values did not sufficiently capture the number of lives improved by programming.

Financially, NDPI/PIND initially committed \$12.5 million to MARKETS II, expecting a matching \$12.5 million from USAID. As of yet, USAID has not been able to meet their funding one-to-one. NDPI/PIND had to withdraw some of its funding, which has been proposed to be invested into a follow-on project with USAID. Discussion is ongoing to ensure that future partnerships build from learnings from MARKETS II and that the USAID Economic Growth program understands NDPI/PIND's approach.



Key Findings and Analysis

This section collects the patterns and insights on collaboration from across the four USAID-NDPI/PIND partnership programs. It is organized around USAID’s three key questions from the 2019 “Private Sector Engagement

Evidence and Learning Plan” in an effort to contribute to a broader body of knowledge that can be leveraged for future PSE partnership design.¹⁰⁰

Key Relationship Qualities

“What PSE relationship qualities influence results?”

–USAID Private Sector Evidence & Learning Plan, Question 3

From the beginning, USAID and NDPI/PIND recognized the strategic imperative of collaboration in the Niger Delta. Stepping into a previously uncharted development space, they needed each other. In many ways, USAID and NDPI/PIND’s partnership in the Niger Delta was an example of best practice for private sector engagement,

especially in its later projects. [Co-locating implementing partner staff in PIND’s office facilitated regular engagement, smooth communication, joint planning, and transparent oversight.](#) Learning flowed both ways as both partners gained skills and knowledge from the other’s experience and expertise.

“PIND housed the [implementing partner] staff for the four years...in their office. It felt like it was our own. Not looking for someone in Abuja, they were right here. The mentorship was very strong.”

– CSO Partner Staff¹⁰¹

Table 8 - Strengths and Weaknesses of the USAID Partnerships with NDPI/PIND

		STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
PLANNING	Agenda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Closely aligned goals for Niger Delta and clear understanding of each partner's motivations • Mutual respect for comparative capabilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sometimes lacked true co-creation, instead only consulting with NDPI/PIND on USAID designs
	Design Process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Various forms of joint or shared analysis, delegated based on strengths of each partner • Clear resource provision planning • NDPI/PIND provided in-kind support so as not to spend too much on implementing partner overhead costs • PIND sat on some USAID technical review committees for the projects that it co-funded 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Program design did not include clauses for adaptive management, allowing for changing technical direction or dissolving the partnership if necessary • Program design did not include clear plans for partners reporting jointly to NDPI/PIND and USAID
	Getting Started	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly engaged leadership at all levels of both organizations supported the partnership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID contracts did not allow sufficient flexibility for adapting to contextual changes • USAID implementing partner could not adjust approach in MARKETS II to match NDPI/PIND's approach
EXECUTION	Relationship Development and Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NDPI/PIND's development and markets experts facilitated smooth cooperation with local private sector partners • Both partners supported each other's capacity building and knowledge development • USAID project staff co-located in PIND's office • PIND office near USAID office in Abuja facilitated regular communication between senior leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID MARKETS II team did not have shared language with NDPI/PIND for engaging private sector partners • Did not have a clear plan for co-branding and sharing the credit for programmatic successes in reports and press releases at the local, national, and international level • USAID and NDPI/PIND lacked coordination for branding in public reports and press releases to ensure consistent recognition of both partners
	Accountability and Oversight	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint monitoring trips to the field • Joint monitoring templates with agreed-upon indicators 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Differing implementation approaches in MARKETS II, and organizational pressures with respect to timing of results, resulted in differing and sometimes contradictory metrics

Note: This is the same table that is presented as Table 1 in the executive summary.

Nevertheless, NDPI/PIND and USAID's partnership still has room to mature. Interviewees from all sides of the partnership spoke to a [need to dig deeper into co-creation at the earliest phases of program inception](#). This cooperation should include more explicit guidance on how to ensure that both partners feel [equal power for decision-making, shared leverage when working with partners to drive accountability, and shared credit](#) celebrating the outcomes of the project that they jointly brand. As a testament to their commitments as learning organizations, it appears that many of these insights will be applied to the agricultural extension project that they plan to co-invest in next.

Beyond their programming partnerships during projects, USAID and NDPI/PIND have [also committed to long-term operational partnerships](#) in the Niger Delta. One PIND staff noted that a senior USAID member contributed to PIND's recent participatory strategy review process, "That speaks to the fact that USAID values PIND and wants to be part of their future."¹⁰²

Contextual Drivers of Partnership

"What context-specific factors drive effective engagement with the private sector?"

– USAID Private Sector Evidence & Learning Plan, Question 2

Since the eruption of violence in the early 2000s, the Niger Delta was largely abandoned by the international development community, due to both security concerns and more pressing development objectives in the northeast of the country, especially with the spread of Boko Haram and the Islamic State. Yet, international energy companies like Chevron remained deeply entrenched in the Niger Delta. As private sector actors, their

social investments remained one of the very few sources of economic development and social service provision, often overshadowing the local government.

"PIND's strategy is partnership... They are doing the market systems development approach, and that is only a facilitative role. It's deliberate. It's not a capacity problem. It's PIND's strategy."

– Independent Journalist¹⁰³

Chevron recognized that the Niger Delta needed more economic development, job creation, and stability for the success of their operations. Chevron, through investments in NDPI/PIND, brought deep knowledge and networks of the Niger Delta and knowledge of the local development context while USAID brought a wealth of international development expertise. Moreover, their complementary and synergistic skills and knowledge along with their combined funding enabled broader and deeper implementation than either could have achieved alone.

Chevron maintains a focus on its own business case for investment, which in the Niger Delta aligns with improved development outcomes. A senior Chevron executive emphasized,

"Link your social investment to the removal of a bottleneck that is affecting the operations. As long as we can always connect the dots of the social investments supporting operations and not the other way around, you can justify it."

– Chevron Staff¹⁰⁴

Although their reasons differed, **USAID and Chevron had shared interest in peace and development in the Niger Delta**. Both partners recognized each other's motivations—Chevron needed stability to continue and expand its business in the region while USAID sought to fulfill its mandate for a more stable, prosperous Nigeria—but they were able to come together around a shared vision. This strategic

importance for both partners remains a driver of engagement today.

In addition, NDPI/PIND's transparency procedures and "stringent" disbursement processes set it apart from other actors in a region where cash transfers were often the norm.¹⁰⁵ These rigorous financial controls were easily compatible with USAID as a co-investor.

Table 9 – USAID and NDPI/PIND Partnership Contributions

USAID Contributions	PIND Contributions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project funding • Value chain expertise • Capacity building and training expertise • National and international reputation, credibility, leverage • National and international networks • Vast development experience and an extensive library of tools and practices • Gender and disability mainstreaming tools 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project funding and in-kind support • Grounded regional knowledge of the Niger Delta • Extensive networks of local entrepreneurs, peace and development actors, and civil society • Positive local reputation • Vast network of local private sector, civil society partners • Connections to hard-to-reach parts of the region • Strong analysis skills • Expertise in market systems • Strong convening power, reputation as a "super-convener" • Lasting commitment to the development of the Niger Delta • Adaptive management capacity and flexibility

For NDPI and PIND, **USAID was an ideal partner for the credibility and leverage it brought to its operations**. Not only did USAID's reputation open doors in the development community and Nigerian government, it also assured Chevron that it was investing wisely through NDPI/PIND. Conversely, **without NDPI/PIND's invitation and deeply rooted presence in the region, USAID would not have expanded its presence across the whole of the Niger Delta**.

"We have found that [USAID] brings technical resources to build capacity, then that capacity stays here. They come with a lot of tools... The other day, I was seeing a partner sharing an outcome harvesting map, [those tools] stay with the local organizations." – PIND Staff¹⁰⁶


Niger Delta Development Outcomes

“How and to what extent does private sector engagement improve development and humanitarian outcomes?” – USAID Private Sector Evidence & Learning Plan, Question 1

In the ten years of partnership to-date, NDPI/PIND and USAID have together **strengthened the capacity of numerous CSOs, business organizations, local governments, and other societal actors seeking the development, stability, and prosperity of the Niger Delta.** NDPI/PIND and USAID have together trained tens of thousands of farmers to pursue agriculture as a business, beyond subsistence, and strengthened the value chains and systems to bring products to markets in the Niger Delta and beyond. This has improved food security and economic growth in communities throughout the region. Both partners admitted that the gains could not have been achieved alone. NDPI/PIND would not have been able to achieve the scale or variety of methodology on its own, and USAID would not have been able to develop as deep or lasting a foothold in the region. Nor would any of their implementation innovations have been achieved without their synergistic cooperation.

One of NDPI/PIND’s most substantial contributions to the partnership is its prioritization of and contribution toward sustainability. As a private sector partner committed to remaining in the region, Chevron gave NDPI/PIND leeway to take its time to explore methods and opportunities, experiment and adapt, seeking out the most cost-effective, lasting approaches for intervention. When local partners are not quite ready to stand alone at the end of a project, NDPI/PIND has been able to offer short-term bridging funds to round out their programming and further capacity training opportunities. NDPI/PIND’s market systems approach and its commitment to partnering with other private sector entities in the Niger Delta have contributed to this sustainability. **Sustainable models take time, but private sector partners who plan on long-term investments can help use that time foster sustainability.**

However, when misaligned with NDPI/PIND’s market systems approach, USAID’s value chain interventions created market distortions by provided funds directly to partners, which had to be later corrected in NDPI/PIND’s work. These distortions could have been avoided with more careful staffing and a shared understanding of NDPI/PIND’s methods and rationale at the early design stages of the project.



The successes of USAID and NDPI/PIND's partnership as they grew together in the Niger Delta attracted the attention of other major development institutions. DFID, the Ford Foundation, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Rotary Foundation, and others are beginning to invest in the Niger Delta to partner with NDPI/PIND and some of NDPI/PIND's partner CSOs—CSOs that developed the capacity to receive international grants through USAID-PIND programming. [USAID and NDPI/PIND's partnership has made way for more partnerships, each of which seeks to improve the development of the Niger Delta.](#)

"We had not thought about a 30-year plan until PIND did this exercise, and the Governor has embraced this project since."


– Edo State Government Official¹⁰⁷

NDPI/PIND's approach aligns with USAID's New Partnerships Initiative (NPI), which calls for greater diversity in implementing partners, "elevating local leadership, fostering creativity and innovation, and mobilizing resources" through a broader diversity of partners.¹⁰⁸

Though not an official participant in NPI yet, NDPI/PIND have helped to incubate numerous other rising partners through CSO capacity building in the Niger Delta. More than just disbursing funding, NDPI/PIND staff work alongside their partners to build their capacity and create environments for success.¹⁰⁹ NDPI/PIND and their partners cultivate sustainability and local self-reliance. For example, NDPI/PIND built upon their excellent rapport with the Edo State and Abia State governments fostered during MARKETS II and ADVANCE to catalyze the States' efforts to draft 30-year development plans.¹¹⁰ These partnerships offer USAID a promising model for development and strengthening of new private sector and civil society partners elsewhere.

"This plan will help us to attract development partners. If you really want development, you have to plan for it, you have to have a roadmap."

– Abia State Government Official¹¹¹



Recommendations

“If you want your model to work for you, you have to keep working the model.”

– Former Senior Chevron Executive

“[Partnership development] ended up being a lot about the plumbing: procurement reform, personnel, and incentive restructuring... We have to have common cause with folks around these issues. We have to figure out the wiring of these relationships... Change management is what really makes the difference.”

– Former Senior USAID Leader

To maintain a healthy and enduring partnership in the Niger Delta that effectively cost-shares sustainable development outcomes and disrupts the systemic patterns

of conflict, corruption, and poverty, NDPI/PIND and USAID should continue to prioritize active learning in their relationship, adapting and growing together.

For USAID/Nigeria other Missions and USAID/Washington Decisionmakers:

Encourage and incentivize staff to develop private sector partnerships. Move from sound policy, as represented in the 2018 *Private Sector Engagement Policy*, to strong culture change that embraces the comparative advantages of the private sector as instrumental partners. Design incentives for Mission staff and Washington, DC headquarters staff to seek out, design, and implement meaningful partnerships with the private sector. These incentives should inspire co-creation and design of joint initiatives and incorporate adaptive management and applied learning. In addition, create opportunities for rewards and recognition for outstanding Agency staff who are operationalizing the PSE Policy effectively.

Ensure that USAID corporate relationship managers have private sector expertise, operational empathy, and sufficient seniority to influence decision-making. USAID staff who are responsible for managing major corporate relationships (e.g. Microsoft, Coca-Cola, Chevron) should have operational empathy for the private sector, and an appreciation of the specific rhythms, motives and approaches of their corporate counterparts. They also need appropriate seniority and influence to affect decisions at the highest levels within the Agency and the private sector in order to action insights gained through the partnership. Toward this end, consider brief exchanges lasting from one week up to a single quarter

between USAID and corporate staff, as was pioneered in the Angola Partnership Initiative, to ground those responsible for successful PSE in organizational and operational contexts. Finally, seek input from private sector partners for 360 reviews and annual evaluations within USAID to better inform current and future partnerships.

Seek true co-creation with private sector partners early in the project design process. Recognize that true co-creation and collaboration require more than just consultation with private sector partners. Bring private sector partners into the project design and planning process as early as possible to leverage their expertise and better reflect their hopes and goals for the initiative. In cases like ADVANCE, where a partner joined with an existing USAID project, bring partner staff into collaboration and planning for the new localized implementation and geographic expansion of the program. In cases like SACE, where a long-term partnership makes way for a newly designed follow-on, bring partner staff into the design phase, to initiate true co-creation. When relevant (e.g., the partner has contributed funds through USAID for the project), include a partner representative on the Technical Evaluation Committees to select implementing partners.

Plan for co-branding and shared press releases to acknowledge partner contributions alongside USAID. Plans for shared branding, media campaigns, and other public reporting should be incorporated into the early phases of program and partnership design. These plans should be co-developed alongside corporate partner staff. This will ensure that

USAID, the corporate sector partner(s), and the implementing partner(s) all have clear expectations of how all partners will be represented on reports and other media releases produced by all parties involved.

Plan monitoring and report processes to minimize reporting burdens from differing fiscal calendars and acknowledge joint accountability. Many private sector partners will not have the same fiscal calendar as USAID. As such, these partners will have different reporting rhythms than those required by USAID's report cycle. Relationship managers should seek a clear understanding of the private sector partner's reporting requirements and schedule at the outset of the partnership. Acknowledging the private sector partner's contributions to the project and related corporate accountability needs, a reporting plan should be co-created to ensure that both USAID and the partner have the reporting they need, when they need it. This includes setting implementing partner expectations on lines of accountability to both USAID and the corporate partner. Direct the implementing partner to develop joint monitoring processes with the private sector partner that 1) limit the reporting burden on partner CSOs, 2) leverage the relative strengths of each partner, and 3) are scheduled to provide timely information for both fiscal calendars. Build this planning as early in the project design process as possible to facilitate smooth update by the implementing partner.

Plan for smooth transitions in relationship turnover. Acknowledge, plan for, and manage according to the reality that both USAID and its private sector partners will

likely experience significant personnel during the partnership lifecycle. Invest in effective handover protocols and backstopping procedures specifically designed to weather these disruptions.

Host fora dedicated to shared reflection and learning on PSE. There is a need for regular learning on PSE outside the context of independent or external programmatic evaluations. Whether in country, at regional platforms, the annual Mission Director's

conference, or special events in Washington, convene diverse private sector actors and engaged Mission staff to explore bright spots, frictions, and key lessons of PSE to feed forward into partnership design, sustainability, and results. Engage entities such as Harvard Business Review, Fast Company, Forbes and other business media to participate in open-door sessions at the convenings to signal the importance of PSE and inform a broader audience of its imperatives and successes.

For PIND:


Ensure that contracts with partner donors include provisions to increase NDPI/PIND's leverage over co-invested projects. Improve leverage over investments during execution by ensuring contracts with large donors (e.g., USAID, DFID) include provisions for co-branding, aligning reporting cycles, clarifying under what conditions stop work happens, and specify accountability procedures between NDPI/PIND and implementing partners. Build on the positive trend of participating in selected USAID Technical Evaluation Committees and seek to make this standard for any future large investments.

Expand PIND's small grants capabilities. Explore and experiment with incubating PIND's implementation capacity via small grants offered throughout the Niger Delta that would "fill in the gaps" between partnership initiatives with USAID and other donors.

Explore connections across operational sectors for synergistic monitoring and implementation. Explore ways to cross-pollinate economic growth, livelihood, and conflict mitigation programs to build linkages between the

programs where useful. For example, market systems partners could be trained to collect and provide conflict and corruption data.

Leverage monitoring data to better inform Chevron Nigeria of contextual dynamics and shifts in the Niger Delta. Consider how to better leverage programmatic monitoring and evaluation data as well as insights about conflict patterns and trendlines from the Partners for Peace platform to inform Chevron Nigeria's business strategy and operations.




For NDPI:

Publicly elevate NDPI/PIND's successes and learnings. Continue to elevate the work and impact of Chevron and NDPI/PIND in the Niger Delta in Washington, DC and other policy capitals via convenings, workshops, and conferences, targeted publications, and even social engagements. Maximize NDPI participation in policy relevant dialogues sponsored by USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and think tanks.

Engage with non-traditional partners to further share NDPI/PIND's proven methods. Consider engaging with non-traditional but relevant parties in other fields who might have an interest in NDPI/PIND's tools and approaches in the Niger Delta and elsewhere. These might include centers of gravity within the Department of Defense (DoD) (e.g., AFRICOM, the Africa

Regional Center at National Defense University, Center for Army Lessons Learned) and other private philanthropies working in Nigeria (e.g., Omidyar Group's Luminare).

Foster social enterprise learning at Chevron across regions. Create opportunities to explore Chevron's social enterprise investment approaches cross-regionally to identify, experiment, and apply shared lessons. Seek outlets for NDPI/PIND to learn from Chevron's other social enterprise investments and *vice versa*. This can help to leverage the insights and lessons learned by USAID and Chevron through their private sector engagement partnerships and apply these to other analogous contexts.



For Other International Oil Companies Operating in the Niger Delta:

Emulate the successes of the NDPI/PIND model. Interrogate and learn from the NDPI/PIND model and unique leadership experiences funding and implementing sound development programs that seek regional and societal change for long-term stability and prosperity in the Niger Delta.

Consider co-investing development initiatives in the region. Evaluate the advantages of cooperation and co-investing development initiatives in the Niger Delta as a bloc of IOCs to achieve greater scale and impact. Instead of creating separate initiatives or seeking to replicate NDPI/PIND's approach, frame a co-created and co-implemented platform that cost shares social enterprise investment at scale.

Recognize and leverage your power for progress. IOC investments and approaches to business operations and social enterprise have an opportunity to either disrupt or reinforce vicious cycles of conflict, underdevelopment, and corruption. Examine the opportunities for positive influence in fenceline communities as well as the potential systematic consequences of business-as-usual.

“Don’t pay off elites and think that gets you off the hook...and don’t just do what the political elite tell you to do... when you do [development] wrong with this much money, it’s terrible... [In this case] it’s not about polluting the earth, it’s about polluting society! ...Discover and understand what’s important to [people] or what’s holding their community back. Understand the constraints and go from there.” – USAID Official¹¹²

For Other Corporations Seeking to Engage USAID in Partnership:

Seek and secure a shared vision for development outcomes that creates a compelling agenda for change. Be transparent about your business motivations but engage in dialogue that educates and informs development professionals about business impact, the potentially transformative results from private sector engagement, and the imperative to cost-share desirable shared outcomes. Demonstrate how your business interests are aligned with and supportive of USAID’s development objectives. Anchor these discussions in USAID’s current policy frameworks (e.g., USAID Private Sector Engagement Policy, 2019 USAID Policy Framework).

“We need to make sure that we understand the reasons why [the private sector] wants to partner with us: profit. We can work with them to make their profit while we are able to improve the lives of our beneficiaries. If those two things are understood, we can collaborate.”

– USAID Foreign Service Officer¹¹³


Formulate learning questions for USAID to explore opportunities for collaboration based on comparative advantage. Explore common cause and true comparative advantage between yourselves and USAID with a set of initial offers or potential contributions and key questions for the Agency about theirs,

seeking to deepen understanding and shared value. Use the answers to these questions to formulate partnerships to solve mutual development challenges.

In Brazil, when USAID was exploring a partnership with a timber company to work in a remote place in the country, USAID assembled the “usual suspects – forest alliances and others.”¹¹⁴ However, the timber company came prepared, stating that they knew their business of planting, cutting, and selling trees, but instead asked USAID about their concerns around high fertility and infant mortality rates in the neighboring communities. This immediately opened an opportunity for complementary, rather than duplicative programming. USAID was able to help the company engage and understand the public health challenges their communities faced and the timber company was able to support sustainable environmental practices.

Design and govern social enterprise investments with independence, sustainability, and resilience in mind. Carefully consider various options for the organizational design, corporate governance, and structure of your social enterprise investment. In the case of the Niger Delta, NDPI/PIND's dual foundation structure supported its longevity, independence, local sustainability, and resilience during personnel turnovers in the company. Pay equal attention to the design and functional organization of the initiative, which will dictate how you deliver the technical expertise.

Consider joining development fora to explore partnership opportunities. Fora organized by USAID, the Department of State, and Congress provide opportunities to hear U.S. government priorities and mingle with other private sector leadership. These include, but are not limited to, the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, USAID's Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, and other regular conferences such as the annual Society for International Development Washington convening and Alliance for Peace's PeaceCon.




For Donors Seeking to Deepen Private Sector Engagement:

Seek opportunities for co-location of implementing teams with private sector partner staff. When co-financing, jointly supervising, and jointly implementing initiatives with a private sector partner, housing implementing staff in the same location as private sector partner staff can facilitate seamless communication and cooperation. This could take the form of implementing partner setting up an office in the same location as the partner's operations, as was the case for Chemonics during *MARKETS II*. Conversely, the donor or implementing partner could also host private sector partner staff in home or satellite offices in the country. When full co-located office teams are not possible, housing one or two representatives from each other's organization in each office could help facilitate smoother cooperation and operational empathy.

Consider the longevity of private sector partnerships. Instead of viewing private sector partnerships as transactional for single projects, view private sector engagement with longevity in mind. Private sector entities often have long-term investments in the locations where they work and therefore can be long-term development partners. Build processes to deepen, evaluate, and learn from the partnership across projects over time.

Be strategic about learning throughout private sector engagement. USAID's learning agenda for its 2019 *Private Sector Engagement Strategy* provides an excellent arsenal of questions about how to better leverage private sector partnerships for development. Implement processes to monitor and learn from private sector engagement across your organization. Importantly, seek opportunities to share this learning with other donors and the private sector.



Conclusion and Future Directions

NDPI/PIND and the partnership with USAID provide a rich and innovative model for pursuing development cooperation in complex and insecure spaces. NDPI/PIND proved that the private sector can lead donors into previously inaccessible areas. The partnership also demonstrated the synergistic value of private sector contextual expertise, business practices, and networks when combined with the deep development experience of traditional donors like USAID. Through long-term commitment to the Niger Delta, USAID and NDPI/PIND developed an effective partnership for development that continues to grow and evolve today. As evidenced by this report, both partners have learned from the synergies and snags of their partnership over time, but this is only a piece of the greater private sector engagement learning journey as a whole.

"You can do stuff on your own – but how much can you accomplish? [You can] only do just so much by yourself. With added experience, skill sets, and funding mixed together, [you] can do more and learn from each other and adapt. That's where sustainability comes in... Not one actor [can] accomplish [that] on its own." – NDPI Staff¹⁵

This report reflects the next step forward in the PSE learning journey, raising several additional questions for future partnerships:

- The NDPI/PIND model is only one of likely numerous successful models for context-adapted, partnership oriented private social enterprise investment. What other successful models exist in other contexts and what can be learned across those models?
- NDPI/PIND co-invested its programs in partnership with USAID by feeding funding through USAID to a single implementing partner, complemented by in-kind assistance. What other co-investing models exist and how do those affect the processes and outcomes of private sector engagement initiatives?
- Recognizing that increased Russian and Chinese activities are taking place in countries where the United States has interests, Great Power Competition has become a U.S. Government foreign policy priority. How can development partnerships with the American private sector abroad strengthen U.S. interests in addition to sound development outcomes?

Endnotes

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